In a world increasingly shaped by geopolitical tensions and conflicts, Dennis Voznesenski’s new book, War and Wheat: Navigating Markets During Global Conflict, offers a timely and insightful analysis of the agricultural sector’s response to war. In an exclusive interview with Miller Magazine, Voznesenski explores the complex landscape of how both historical and contemporary conflicts affect the functioning of grain markets and reveal vulnerabilities within agricultural supply chains.

Dennis Voznesenski

Drawing from his extensive experience and interactions with major players in the grain industry, Voznesenski looks at the parallels between the responses of the agricultural industry during the World Wars and today’s challenges, particularly the war in Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic. Voznesenski highlights that despite significant advancements in farming practices, the logistics of getting agricultural commodities to market remain largely unchanged. The book’s analysis is not only relevant for understanding the past but is also crucial for anticipating the future of global food security.

As we explore the themes of War and Wheat, join us for insights from Dennis Voznesenski on how global grain markets withstand the pressures of conflict, and discover the critical steps that need to be taken for a sustainable agricultural future.

Mr. Voznesenski , your book examines the agricultural industry’s response to both world wars. What are some of the key parallels you discovered between those historical responses and how the industry is handling modern conflicts, like the war in Ukraine? 

While farming practices have improved substantially, the ways that agricultural commodities can get to market, and from where, has changed very little. Both now and during the two World Wars, a significant proportion of global wheat exports came from the Black Sea. Both then and now, the majority of the global wheat trade depended on ocean freight. Large wheat importers are just as vulnerable now as they were a 100 years ago to broader conflict disrupting supply chains. Similarly, large exporters are just as susceptible to large supply chain disruptions that would limit their ability to move product. All that has to happen is for shipping availability to drop. 

Could you walk us through the main sections of War and Wheat? How did you decide on the structure, and are there specific chapters that you feel are especially crucial for readers to understand the broader message?

The focus of the book is looking at global conflict through the lens of Australian agriculture. The book is broken down into three major eras: WWI, WWI and present day. Present day covers COVID and the war in Ukraine. The key finding of the book is that the Australian agricultural industry will struggle to do any better than it did 100 years ago in a broader conflict, unless more domestic demand is created. During a broader conflict, shipping disappears, and with it dissipates Australia’s ability to export. This very quickly can result in a substantial local oversupply. 

Writing such a comprehensive book must have required a significant amount of time and dedication. What were some of the biggest challenges you encountered along the way?

The largest challenge was reading over 3,000 historic newspaper articles from the beginning of WWI to the end of WWII in order to synthesise a story. 

COVID-19 was a unique challenge, distinct from wartime. How did this pandemic test agricultural supply chains in ways similar to or different from global conflicts, and what were the most surprising vulnerabilities revealed?

Rarely in history did governments around the world get involved more in agriculture than they did at the beginning of COVID. The initial weeks of the pandemic were mired globally with export bans and panic. European countries put border checks in place between one another, slowing trade. Meanwhile, Russia put in place a very short-lived limitation on wheat exports. However, the grains industry very quickly found its feet. Despite the occasional port disruption, grain continued to flow to global markets. For Australia, one of the biggest concerns were whether sufficient agrochemicals could be sourced from China. Australian farmers were preparing for the first good season following three years of drought.

You discuss the functionality and fragility of markets under the strain of conflict. In your opinion, which parts of the agricultural market infrastructure are most at risk in future conflicts, and which have shown the greatest resilience?

Without doubt, the largest vulnerability, both for imports and exports is freight. During a conflict, freight availability shrinks substantially. Either it is sunk by the enemy or requisitioned by governments for military use. If an exporter can’t get sufficient freight, grain piles up at port, begins to rot, and prices for farmers decline substantially, and with it the whole sector declines. For importers, the impact of insufficient freight to get grain is self-explanatory. In fact, there were times during WWII when on paper there was a surplus of wheat, however, in reality there were large, localised shortages in parts of the world. 

With the trend toward globalization, the agriculture sector has become highly interconnected. How do you think countries can balance the benefits of global trade with the need for self-reliance in times of conflict?

When geopolitics becomes increasingly volatile, governments tend to start focusing on self-sufficiency. Large government induced production can lead to periods of significant oversupply globally and depressed prices. This is something that should be watched out for.

Drawing from your interactions with major global grain merchants and food manufacturers, what approaches do you think the industry could adopt to increase resilience against the unforeseen shocks of global conflict?

From the perspective of Australia, the country should be creating more domestic demand, so there is less exposure to overseas markets. Specifically, creating a domestic biofuels industry. A local crop-based fuel industry would allow Australia to be less reliant on grain exports, and increase fuel self-sufficiency. Over 90% of Australia’s current fossil fuel comes from overseas. During times of offshore volatility, Australia’s critical industries would be able to function uninterrupted if more fuel was produced locally. Furthermore, a biofuel industry can support Australia in reaching its emission reduction targets.

Your book urges a critical conversation on national security in agriculture. What role do you think governments should play in preparing the industry for future conflicts, and do you see enough action being taken on this front?

For a domestic biofuels industry to be built in Australia, it is very likely that some sort of government support would be needed initially. This could, for example, include direct financial support to build facilities or mandates.

How is the rising demand for biofuels impacting the global grain market, and what long-term trends do you foresee in grain allocation between food and energy needs?

Rising demand for biofuels increases the demand for crops to be grown for fuel, true. However, it also supports the economic wellbeing of farmers via better demand and in theory prices for their crops. A healthy farming sector is able to respond far better to global shortages, including of food crops. The food versus fuel debate will always be a challenge. In the case of Australia, the majority of Australian canola already heads to Europe to be used in biofuels already. With geopolitics, especially in the Black Sea and Middle East continuing to escalate, fuel security will be an increasingly vital topic for fuel importing countries like Australia.