Cesar Augusto Soares
Consultant & Strategic Advisor

The next 25 years will not simply be a continuation of the last 25. The grains and oilseeds industry has been transformed by scale, consolidation, logistics and technology. The road to 2050, however, will be shaped by slower demand growth, shifting geography, continued yield gains, changing diets, energy uncertainty, digital disruption and a gradual rebalancing of power from the supply side to the demand side.

Introduction: A Quarter Century in Perspective

The global grains and oilseeds industry stands at a critical inflection point. The year 2050 is no longer a distant or almost mystical concept; it is now within the operational planning horizon of today’s industry leaders. It also sits at the midpoint of a century likely to deliver some of the most significant and rapid changes in technology, society, demographics and consumption habits ever witnessed in the modern era.

The rate of change is a central theme. It makes predictive modelling based on historical outcomes more complex and suggests that the past structure of an industry or market is not necessarily a reliable roadmap for navigating the future. This presents a major challenge for industry and business leaders, requiring deeper and more forward-looking analysis, and a move away from purely historical decision-making and valuation models.

The past 25 years were not linear. The period from 2000 to 2010 was shaped by low growth, the dot-com bubble and the financial crisis; the following decade by rapid growth, low interest rates and low inflation; and the last five years by the Covid pandemic, supply-chain disruptions, higher inflation, higher interest rates, rapid advances in AI and machine learning, and accelerating asset valuations. These shifts show how much can change within a relatively short period of time.

Technology is also changing in a fundamentally different way. In 2000, technological change was still largely infrastructure-led, driven by the internet, mobile phones, PCs and early e-commerce. In 2026, it is increasingly system-led: AI improves software, software improves chips, chips improve AI, and cloud platforms distribute innovation almost instantly. This creates a compounding loop in which innovation is no longer linear, but recursive and accelerating.

It is within this context that understanding the potential outcomes for 2050 becomes both fascinating and important. This article explores the transformation of the grains and oilseeds industry between 2000 and 2025, the key lessons learned over this period, the structural forces shaping the next 25 years, and what all of this means for millers, processors and end-users.

The goal is not prediction, but perspective — and to provoke thought among those responsible for navigating long-term strategy in an increasingly complex agri-food system. While we cannot hope to predict an unpredictable future, we can try to prepare for it.

2000–2025: A PERIOD OF EXTRAORDINARY EXPANSION

The past 25 years have been marked by remarkable growth and transformation across the global grains and oilseeds sector.

Table 1

• Global population grew from 6.1 billion to 8.2 billion (+34%)
• Global grain exports nearly doubled (+88%)
• Oilseeds exports surged by over 200%
• Combined grain and oilseed trade expanded by 118%
• Biofuels production increased more than eightfold

According to the data in Table 2: 

• Corn yields have grown significantly over this period
• Brazil and Ukraine corn yields doubled (100%+)
• USA and China corn yields up significantly (36%-40%)

Table 2

At the same time, the industry itself has fundamentally changed:

The ABCDs, together with other major trading firms, originators, crushers and exporters that shaped the past quarter century, look very different in 2026 than they did in 2000. They have professionalized, shifted from pure proprietary physical trading to supply chain management, and become more integrated across the value chain. They are larger, more corporate, more profitable and more asset-heavy, with businesses and infrastructure at both origin and destination.

The Consolidation of the Supply Side

The supply side has consolidated. Andre & Cie, Glencore Agriculture (later Viterra), Nidera, Soufflet, Noble, Toepfer and Vicentin are all names and companies that existed and played a major role in the market in the early 2000’s, and which no longer either exist independently, have been sold, have merged or simply gone out of business. Within 2025 and the first months of 2026 alone, we have witnessed the takeover of Viterra by Bunge and the confirmation of sale of 80% of Olam Agri to SALIC. 

Ports, Storage and Logistics Enter a New Era

Asset intensity — ports, storage and logistics networks — increased and improved dramatically across the key origins. Brazil more than doubled port capacity, opened Northern ports, road logistics and river export corridors, and expanded interior transport, storage and handling capacity, reinforcing Santos’ role as its leading export port. Ukraine emerged as a major grains and oilseeds exporter through a substantial build-out of sea and river port capacity, creating a high-performance, export-driven logistics system that has remained resilient despite wartime disruptions. Russia also expanded into a major grains exporter and became the world’s largest wheat exporter, with stronger capacity and efficiency, growing transshipment at Kavkaz, new Black Sea terminals and expanding Baltic port capacity. Australia saw more moderate capacity growth but significant gains in efficiency and loading rates, supported by deregulation and modernization. In the United States, export capacity was already largely mature at the start of the century, but modernization and efficiency gains in the US Gulf and PNW further strengthened the system.

The supply side became more powerful and concentrated. The sum of the industry consolidation, the professionalization and transformation of the large trading companies and the expansion in exports and inland logistics and assets at the major origins translated to a stronger, more coordinated and more powerful offer/supply side. In addition, the large growth in global population over this period has “pulled” the supply by increasing the demand base and incentivizing farmers to deploy technology and best practices by investing in improving efficiencies and yields. This combination of the farmer needing to increase his crops and supply, and the parallel concentration of the supply chain, has translated to a period where the supply “took charge” of the market and where price evolutions, volatility and change were mainly driven by supply side and supply chain constraints and factors.

For millers this era brought:

More reliable global supply chains

The growth of Ukraine and Russia as major exporters and the expansion of acreage and production in South America and the yield growth in the USA, together with the expansion in internal and export logistics and the consolidation of the supply side companies, have all contributed to a more efficient and reliable supply chain in 2026 versus 2000. Buyers and importers have a greater choice of suppliers, better industry and regulatory standards supporting the trade, more information to help form decisions and better control of quality.

Increased efficiency in sourcing

The increase in supply chain efficiency and effectiveness, and the increase in export origins and suppliers, has allowed global buyers to become more efficient in their own procurement and sourcing, progressively moving away from building stocks at destination and towards a greater just-time procurement and purchase strategy. Buyers typically act “hand-to-mouth”, buying and contracting for shipments usually no more than 2 months forward, a pattern which has become more entrenched and is now considered as the standard or the norm.

Greater dependance on large multinational suppliers

“Hand-to-mouth” sourcing does not allow for many errors, delays or defaults by suppliers, particularly in periods of disruption, and this has generally shifted buyers to prefer, or to at least prioritize, the large global suppliers and trading companies as suppliers. 

In summary, the past 25 years have been a period of exceptional, maybe even extraordinary, growth in the global grains and oilseeds commodities markets. The population has grown, demand has grown faster, crop production has grown even faster and the scale of the overall market, and the size and reach of the supply side traders and exporters, is significantly larger, more professionalized and more efficient than at the start of the Century.

KEY LESSONS FROM THE LAST 25 YEARS

Several structural truths have emerged, lessons that remain highly relevant for the grains and oilseeds industry and the milling sector:

1. The World Does Not Run Out of Food

Despite geopolitical shocks and population growth, global supply has generally adjusted to demand. Prices have seen temporary spikes, but food shortages have remained largely localised, often linked to conflict, logistical disruption or other external shocks.

2. Price Spikes Are Temporary

Major supply shocks lead to price rallies, but these are followed by production responses and normalization. Prices always come down after a major production/supply related event or shock (we have basically had 3 major rallies in corn in 25 years, each one led by a major supply side issue, each of the 3 rallies peaked out between 7 and 8 $/bu CME corn price and the global farmer, and new technologies, rewarded the price with a significant increase of crop production in the subsequent years) 

Chart 1: CME corn 2000 to 2025

Chart 2: CME wheat 2000 to 2025

Chart 3: CME soybeans 2000-2025

3. Farmers Always Respond

Higher prices incentivize acreage expansion and yield improvements, the “don’t bet against the farmer” principle. 

Chart 4: Global corn production 2000 to 2025

4. Supply-Side Power Has Dominated

By 2026, fewer than 25 companies control over 75% of global export flows. Some estimates call for a total trade volume of 540 mill MT grains and oilseeds between the ABCD (ADM, Bunge, Cargill and LDC) in 2022, which would represent roughly over 80% of total grains and oilseeds global trade, amongst the ABCD alone. 

These estimates on traded volume very often include “paper” as well as physical shipped volumes to the end buyer or consumer, and they also include other agri-commodities such as sugar, cocoa, coffee and others, and as such are very difficult to use as “hard” estimates. 

But it sufficiently holds and supports the thesis that the ABCD, together with the next 21 top global originators and exporters (including COFCO International, Olam Agri, CHS, The Andersons and the regional leaders like Ameropa (Romania), Demetra and Aston (Russia), Kernel and Nibulon (Ukraine), Amaggi (Brazil), Molinos (Argentina), and the large French / German / Polish / Canadia / Australian/ US / Argentine independents and co-ops), control at least 75% of the global grains and oilseeds flows, and the actual total might be much, much higher.

5. Demand Is Fragmented

Unlike the consolidated supply side, buyers, especially millers, remain highly fragmented across regions. The role of national buying entities has diminished significantly over the past 25 years. Institutions such as GASC in Egypt, OAIC in Algeria, MIT in Jordan, ODC in Tunisia, TMO in Turkey and SAGO in Saudi Arabia remain active buyers, particularly across North Africa and the Middle East, but their volumes and their role as demand aggregators and price makers have declined relative to the scale of total import volumes.

Private buying entities also remain fragmented and competitive. Even in the wheat market, where large integrated buyers such as PT Indofood, Flour Mills of Nigeria, PT Bungasari, Crown Flour Mills and Grupo Trimex play important roles, most countries still follow a fragmented import pattern: the largest three to five importers may account for 25–50% of volumes, while the balance is distributed among a long list of importers, traders, millers, speculators and warehousemen. With more than 135 countries importing grains and oilseeds globally, this fragmentation remains a significant structural feature of demand. 

6. Financing Is a Bottleneck

Financing is a key, and increasingly important, bottleneck to global trade. Compliance, sanctions, poor returns, cases of fraud and misappropriation, anti-money laundering rules, tariff wars and geopolitical uncertainties have all contributed to a narrowing and tightening of trade finance, which has resulted into a greater funneling of financing into bigger, more stable, hands, consequently benefitting the larger traders and exporters, and being one of the drivers of the ongoing consolidation.The reliance on physical paper documents, long supply chains and generally low barriers to entry into the business, makes this trend understandable, albeit inhibiting and limiting.

7. Wheat Is Not as Politically Sensitive as We Expected

Prior to  2022, most market commentators, traders and analysts would likely have agreed (consensus is often impossible to achieve in our industry, but I do believe that there was a consensus on this topic) that an outright war between Russia and Ukraine, two of the world’s largest wheat, and grains, exporters, and the setters of the world cash price for wheat, would be considered as catastrophic for global food security and geopolitics, and most likely lead to a dramatic, and sustained, increase in wheat price globally, and it would set in motion a wave of massive global stock building and intervention purchases by governments.

Prices did spike in February to June 2022 and new record levels were set in CME wheat and MATIF. Cash wheat prices also spiked, with some trades taking place in the period of March -June 2002 at levels as high as 450$ FOB or even 500$ CIF North African ports.

But this rally proved to be based largely on short-covering and panic-buying, particularly as both outright and spread positions on the derivatives markets were stopped-out within the extreme volatility, and by late June 2022 the markets started slipping. 

Wheat effectively entered a bear market in mid 2022 which lasted all the way to the Gulf War in 2026 and the blocking of the Hormuz straits. Wheat has, since the start of this new conflict found a new floor and rallied, but remains relatively towards the lower end of the historical trading range and price.

The evidence of the last 4 years strongly suggests that the global wheat trade is more resilient than previously imagined and that the improvement in global supply chains has had a significant impact in smoothening out supply-side disruptions. The world has resisted “weaponizing food” and grains and oilseeds, and food in general, remain outside of global sanctions and embargoes, even within the most extreme disruptions and events. 

This does not mean that the various global conflicts have not touched wheat, and food: 

Ukrainian ports were blocked at the start of the war and remained heavily limited to movement through most of 2022 and 2023. Silos, terminals and warehouses have been hit, some major Ukrainian (grains exports) ports are completely non-operational, and a significant quantity of Ukrainian grains and oilseeds have been lost and/or destroyed. Russian port infrastructure has more recently started to become a target, as has commercial shipping in the Black Sea in general.

The war in the Gulf directly impacts global shipping via higher crude, and bunker prices, and created regional instability in one of the world’s most important grains and oilseeds imports regions.

Despite all the above, wheat prices remain towards the lower end of the historical range.

Chart 5: CME wheat 2022 to date

8. The Funds and Investor Community Seem to be Right, Often

The funds and investment money appear to have been more often right than wrong, which for traders at commodities firms has been a very tough pill to swallow. The instinct to position “against the funds” has been tempting ever since the growth in money inflows to grains and oilseeds starting in the early 2000’s. Supply-side traders have a natural instinct to be “long”, but the price evidence shows us that the market has spent the last 25 trending lower (from a few price spikes) and that, on aggregate, the risk-reward has been skewed to the “short” side, or at least, that major rallies need to be “sold”.

9. Grains and Oilseeds are Not an Attractive Asset Class

Grains and oilseeds have proved to be a commodity, rather than an asset class, and have shown a net decrease in real value over time. While grains and oilseeds are a currency hedge, at least in protecting against local/domestic devaluation, it is not an inflation hedge. 

This makes sense when considering the large increase in global yields and productivity, which sets the grains and oilseeds sector separate from non-Agri commodities, and even from soft commodities within the Agri commodity complex. The industrialization and expansion of grains and oilseeds production has shifted the “new crop” from a moment of uncertainty and potential deficit to a moment where the next wave of record, or near record supply, will “hit the markets”.

Chart 6: Inflation adjusted grains and oilseeds prices 1912 to 2018

Chart 7: May 2016 to May 2026: 10 years where Gold is 3x and CME corn almost flat

Chart 8: US corn area versus yield: 2025 yields above 185 bu/acre

LOOKING AHEAD: THE FORCES SHAPING 2026–2050

1. Slowing Population Growth, Shifting Geography

Global population growth is expected to slow significantly (at a rate of 0.72% annually vs the 1.4% annual growth we experienced over the last 25 years), reaching approximately 9.7 billion by 2050 (as per UN estimates), with most of the growth concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa. 

For the milling industry, this implies:

• Strong demand growth in Africa
• Slower growth (or stagnation) in mature markets
• Increasing regionalization of consumption

2. Africa: The Defining Opportunity

Africa represents both:

• A major demand center
• A massive future supply base

Africa has an enormous upside 

Not only is the population set to grow to 2.5 billion by 2050 (by UN estimates), i.e. over 25% of the world’s population will live in sub-Saharan Africa, but sub-Saharan Africa has up to 300 million hectares (roughly 1 billion MT+ crops potential) of available land suitable for planting. The reality of existing port, road and rail infrastructure is simply that the only solution for the massive increase in demand will be domestic production. 

Africa will likely add massive demand but also add massive supply. For millers:

• Local production may increasingly replace imports
• Investment in regional processing capacity will be critical
• Infrastructure (ports, rail, storage) will define competitiveness

3. The Energy Transition and Its Impact on Grains

Biofuels remain a major demand driver, particularly for corn. Current disruptions in Gulf energy and oil supply chains, and the resulting spikes in energy prices, are likely to support a stronger global consensus in favor of increased biofuel and bioethanol use over the next 10–15 years.

This additional industrial and energy demand for grains and oilseeds may arrive just as human consumption begins to plateau, potentially becoming a key support for overall demand and a major driver of future plantings and production expansion.

However, the rise of electric vehicles could eventually reduce long-term demand for ethanol — and for fossil fuels more broadly. The question is not whether this transition happens, but when. Full global EV adoption may fall outside the next 25 years, but it is likely within a 35–50-year horizon, and could create one of the most significant negative macro price shocks in modern economic history.

At that point, a major share of oil demand linked to road transportation would also need to find alternative uses, potentially competing with biofuels and putting downward pressure on energy, grains and oilseeds prices. This creates major uncertainty around one of the largest structural demand pillars for the market over the next 25 years.

4. Yield Growth 

Technological advancements are likely to drive continued yield increases globally. Yield growth might not replicate the same as the past 25 years for the countries in Table 2, but the countries not on this table, and for the broad grouping of minor producers globally, there is still likely large, double-digit yield growth potential.

It is important to keep in mind that grains and oilseeds are grown extensively around the world. While the bulk of the global exports and trade flows are concentrated in a few countries and regions, most countries in the world (estimates range as high as up to 120-140 countries) plant either wheat, corn, barley, sorghum or an oilseeds crop, making grains and oilseeds the most widely cultivated Agri commodities globally, setting them apart as quite distinct, and creating a significant incentive for governments, farmers and consumers to ensure that global yield and technology best-practices are applied locally.

 Key implications:

• Supply growth may outpace demand
• Structural surpluses could emerge
• Margins across the value chain—including milling—may be variable

5. Changing Diets and Demand Patterns

Shifts in global consumption patterns could materially affect grain demand, particularly through health trends, reduced carbohydrate consumption, the rise of obesity treatments such as GLP-1 drugs, and a potential decline in per capita calorie intake.

Even small changes in diets can have major aggregate demand effects. Human diets are changing, with greater attention being paid to health, and consumers in both developing and developed markets are gradually moving away from the traditional food pyramid in which carbohydrates form the foundation.

Over the past 25 years, population growth and rising obesity rates have acted as a demand accelerator, especially for carbohydrate demand, benefiting corn and wheat. The key question for the next 25 years is whether GLP-1 receptor agonists, or their successors, can significantly reduce obesity and calorie intake. If they are widely adopted and remain effective, they could remove a meaningful amount of future corn and wheat demand, particularly in mature markets.

6. China’s Strategic Shift

I believe Chinese demand will still grow, at least over the next decade. but I am convinced (as I am for Africa) that China domestic grains and oilseeds production will increase significantly. 

It is not a wild assumption, it is based on government policy, and I am convinced that China will achieve this by doing all the necessary between farming commercialization and industrialization and yield increase via technology and better inputs (already the steps on GMO adoption are very significant). 

Here I now make a prediction: China will become a net corn exporter by 2035 (I believe in fact by 2028/2029) and it will produce at least 50% of its soybeans demand by the same date (2035), and even further, it will be almost completely self-sufficient for its soybeans demand by 2050 (i.e., minimal imports in 20250 vs 100 mill MT+ imports in 2025).

In summary, my expectation is for China to:

• Increase domestic production significantly
• Reduce dependence on imports
• Potentially become a net exporter in key grains

This would represent a structural shift in global trade flows.

7. Technology Will Transform the Industry

By 2050, technologies such as AI, machine learning, robotics, blockchain, alternative fintech, decentralized systems, satellite and high-speed connectivity, and digital trade platforms will fundamentally reshape trade execution, logistics, financing and transparency.

For millers, and the grains and oilseeds industry, this will likely imply:

Greater access to market information: interpretation rather than data becomes the competitive advantage

More efficient procurement and logistics systems: real time monitoring will transform quality, quantity and documentary management and greatly minimize operational risks

Potential disintermediation of traditional trading structures: alternative financing structures are the core pillar to any significant industry transformation

WHAT WILL THE INDUSTRY LOOK LIKE IN 2050?

Based on these forces, several structural outcomes emerge:

1. Trade Growth May Stall: Global trade in grains and oilseeds may grow by less than 10%—or even decline from 2025 levels. 

2. Power Shifts to the Demand Side: As supply expands faster than demand, buyers, including large millers, gain leverage. The highly consolidated supply side, and the ever-more efficient supply chains, will place a premium on demand, creating the room and incentive for the development and growth of demand side players.

3. Demand Consolidation: We may see the emergence of large, multi-regional demand players—the “EFGHs”—mirroring today’s trading ABCD’s. (most likely outcome is that the ABCD’s expand and grow their supply-chain role, and dominance, much into the destination and the demand markets)

4. Supply-Side Fragmentation Returns: Technology and financing innovation could lower barriers to entry, enabling smaller traders to compete again. Ongoing farming industrialization and improved agronomic technology, farmland consolidation and the resulting increase in incremental farming margins will likely introduce a new category of very large agro-farming-exporters that will look to secure the entire supply and value chain from the farm to the final consumer.

5. Lower Volatility—But More Extreme Spikes: More efficient markets may reduce average market price volatility. But supply shocks will likely be more dramatic and may create sharper, more “outlier” price movements. In the supply-side led markets of 2000-2025, the main players in the market, the farmers and the supply side traders, were structurally long, implying that they performed well in supply shocks and price rallies and bringing a consolidated “natural selling” to the market. In the potential demand-side led markets in the run-up to 2050, the main players, the buyers and the demand side traders, will be structurally short, the reverse of the current market, and will likely result in exacerbated short covering, particular within supply shock events. 

6. Africa Becomes Central

Africa is likely to be the most important growth region across production, consumption, and investment. Africa will become, by far, the world’s largest region of both agricultural production and food consumption and will be the driver of global economic growth rates.

Implications for the milling industry

For millers, the next 25 years will require a strategic rethink.

From Price Takers to Strategic Buyers: Greater demand-side power creates opportunities—but also requires scale and sophistication.

Investment in Origin: Securing supply may increasingly require upstream integration or partnerships.

Regionalization: Local production and processing will become more important, especially in emerging markets.

Digital Transformation: Adopting new technologies will be essential for competitiveness.

Demand Innovation: New uses for grains and oilseeds—beyond traditional food applications—will define growth opportunities.

CONCLUSION: POSITIONING FOR THE FUTURE

The next 25 years will not simply be an extension of the past. They will be defined by:

• Slower demand growth
• Technological disruption
• Geographic shifts in supply and demand
• Structural changes in market power

For industry participants—including millers—the key question is not what will happen, but:

Will you be positioned in the right place, at the right time?

Because history shows one thing clearly:

Those who anticipate change, will shape the future. Those who don’t, will simply react to it.