Tim Worledge
Consultant & Founder
tim@theuc.co.uk

The old order is fracturing. The Global South has a window. It may not stay open for long.

Imagine a century where opportunity rewards well-laid plans. Where a force we might call fate allows momentum to build undisturbed. In that world, the rise of the Global South would define the era. 

This is not that world.

In agricultural markets – and grain in particular – the developed world’s rupture is not theoretical. Relationships with existing suppliers, critical elements in a supply chain, are increasingly fragile. Uncertainty over price direction and fundamentals is rife. Data is being weaponised, and price signals with it.

Western powers are beset by a confluence of calamities they set in motion. Stock markets may give a sense of confidence, but physical trade feels fragile. The United States is leaning on kneejerk tariffs, unilateral leverage and military action. Europe is exporting regulation as its bedrock international relationships fray. Russia’s cannibalised war economy is reshaping flows of energy and grain, as Moscow nationalises the sector to exert greater control.

How you feel about any of these is immaterial. Rarely in modern history has an incumbent order appeared willing to abandon positions central to maintaining its powerbase.

Normally that would play to the gathering momentum of the Global South, where economic growth is now outstripping that of the G7 group of industrialised nations. The disparate group spans Brazil and Argentina as export powerhouses, the Middle East and North Africa as critical demand centres, and Asia as an increasingly dominant force in consumption.

But the moment is fraught with risk, and the opportunity to build resilience may not last long.

THE BLACK SEA AS A FAULT LINE

The Black Sea is a case in point. Long a key origin for Middle East and North Africa demand, it extended its horizon to the markets of Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. But war has complicated the picture.

A willingness to leverage access to natural resources, the onset of sanctions and tariffs in the face of confrontation, and the exposure of supply chain strains has pressed home the need to diversify. But the pragmatic reality of life as a miller is that only certain grains will do. Broadening your supply options is aspirational, but not always practical.

Russian wheat exports have been redistributed. Europe has effectively disappeared as a destination, while flows have fragmented across a wider base of smaller markets, even as Egypt has consolidated its position as a central anchor.

MENA MOVES FROM PRICE TAKER TO PRICE MAKER

In part, the export figures reflect what’s happening in key importing destinations. A slate of investments in logistics and storage, port expansions and processing has transformed a price taker into a price maker.

Demand in the Middle East and North Africa has not simply absorbed re-routed Black Sea flows, it has adapted to it, becoming more central, more strategic, and more influential in shaping trade flows.

If the Black Sea has become the fault line in global grain markets, then the Middle East and North Africa have emerged as one of its most important anchor points.

Egypt has consolidated its position as the single largest and most consistent buyer of Russian wheat. Large, price-sensitive buyers exert influence simply by virtue of scale – and in a fragmented system, that influence becomes more pronounced.

BUYERS BECOME MORE ADAPTIVE

What has changed is not the region’s dependence on imports, but how that dependence is managed. Buying behaviour has become more tactical, even as investment in storage and logistics lays the groundwork for more strategic planning.

That enables shorter coverage periods, greater flexibility in origin, and a willingness to move quickly as prices shift. In a market where supply chains are under pressure and information is increasingly contested, the role of the buyer is no longer passive. It is adaptive, and at times decisive. Regional agreement on standardized commercial terms and specifications would bring further efficiency. 

Investment underpins the change. Across the region, governments and private entities have expanded storage capacity, upgraded logistics, and strengthened institutional control over procurement and distribution.

In Egypt, additional silo capacity and plans for a regional grain hub in the Suez Canal zone reflect a deliberate effort to manage both supply risk and price volatility. In Saudi Arabia, the model is more systemic, with sovereign-backed entities overseeing procurement, storage and supply chains at scale.

Much of this investment predates the most recent phase of market disruption, and increasingly, that investment is being funded and directed locally, but its significance has only grown as volatility rises. The result is a region that remains structurally dependent on imports but is more capable of managing that dependence on its own terms.

That distinction matters. Demand is no longer simply absorbing change – it is helping to shape it. Physical trade has started to adjust, but the systems beneath it have not moved as quickly.

The physical shift is backed by significant investment from international and regional investors. Capital is flowing to the projects that need it. But much of international trade is still founded on the US dollar. There are voices that urge an end to dollar denominated trade, but in many cases those voices come from players that have a stake in the game.

In a world where leaders have increasingly swung behind overtly nationalistic positions, replacing one financial hegemony with another simply shifts the primary beneficiary.

Pragmatism and flexibility are essential. The goal is not to escape the dollar, but to reduce dependency on any single system. Those best positioned to benefit will not be those who step outside the system entirely, but those who learn to operate within it on their own terms.

Intrinsically connected to financial muscle is independent risk management. Just as the dollar holds sway over international trade, risk management remains heavily anchored in futures markets that are predicated on US corn, wheat and soybean fundamentals.

Regional exchanges such as Brazil’s B3, China’s Dalian, or India’s NCDEX provide local alternatives, but liquidity remains well behind that of major international benchmarks.

The challenge is not simply to create new platforms, but to build the liquidity and trust that underpin any effective risk management system. That cannot be engineered overnight. The onus is on the industry to support that transition – engaging governments, encouraging financial participation and, critically, educating market participants on the role that risk management plays in building resilience.

BUILDING CAPABILITY, NOT JUST INFRASTRUCTURE

Equally, trading infrastructure, data systems and market intelligence remain concentrated in a small number of global hubs. The same is true of price discovery and quality benchmarks, which point into established systems that feed US and European-located exchanges.

These are structural constraints. Addressing them requires more than investment in infrastructure – it requires capability across the entire system.

In all cases, wholesale re-invention of the wheel is neither practical nor advisable, and the sinews of international trade need to be supported. The infrastructure of arbitration, contract law and quality assurance also default to established jurisdictions, but more can be done by governments to support regional solutions.

TECHNOLOGY CAN STRENGTHEN RESILIENCE

Technological innovation will also build resilience. Tools supporting precision agriculture, yield monitoring and AI-driven procurement are already delivering returns – but tangible steps are needed.

Brazil’s Embrapa and India’s Central Food Technological Research Institute – particularly its International School of Milling – demonstrate what institutional commitment to agricultural technology can achieve at scale. A serious re-examination of gene editing, particularly drought-tolerant strains requiring fewer chemical inputs, would address several pressures simultaneously and deserves a place in that conversation. Collaboration among Global South countries could enable shared food standards and uniform requirements for imports. 

Opportunities need husbandry. Market forces alone will not be sufficient – change requires coordination to reach its full potential. That means farmers, industry and government working in lockstep to deliver collaborative solutions – and recognise that domestic protectionist decisions can prioritise short-term stability over longer term structural efficiencies.

The UN estimates the Global South now generates 40% of world output, nearly half of merchandise trade and over half of investment inflows. But the region is also in the forefront of climate change – particularly in Africa and Latin America. As host to 85% of the world’s population, the grain trade is not a peripheral concern – it is the proving ground.

European, Russian and US missteps present a window of opportunity, but seizing it is not inevitable, and the path ahead is uncertain. The same rupture that has exposed the fragility of the old order has created the conditions for something new to take root.

Success depends not on fate, and not on the next shock, but on what is built in the spaces between them. The Global South has the momentum, the resources, and increasingly the institutional architecture to act. The question that will define the next decade is whether it has the will.