Sudhakar Tomar, President of the India Middle East Agri Alliance (IMEAA) Ecosystem, says the Middle East conflict and pressure on the Strait of Hormuz have exposed deeper vulnerabilities in global food and fertilizer supply chains, raising risks for grain, pulses and feed markets from the Gulf to South Asia and Africa. In an interview with Miller Magazine, Tomar argues that the India–Middle East agri corridor is no longer just a trade route, but a strategic food-security architecture, with pulses, rice, processed foods, agritech, storage, logistics and risk management set to define the next phase of regional cooperation.

Sudhakar Tomar
President of the India Middle East
Agri Alliance Ecosystem

Tensions in the Middle East and renewed pressure on the Strait of Hormuz are exposing vulnerabilities that go far beyond energy markets. For Sudhakar Tomar, President of the India Middle East Agri Alliance Ecosystem, the crisis has become a stress test for global food security, linking fertilizer prices, freight disruption, insurance costs, grain flows, feed ingredients and import-dependent food systems across the Gulf, South Asia, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.

In this interview with Miller Magazine, Tomar argues that the India–Middle East agricultural corridor has moved from being a commercial trade lane to a strategic food-security architecture. He sees rice as the anchor of the relationship, pulses as a major growth opportunity, and value-added processed foods and agritech as the next frontiers of cooperation. He also warns that millers, grain traders and food processors can no longer rely on pre-crisis procurement models. Origin diversification, longer planning horizons, strategic buffer stocks, secure logistics infrastructure and digital procurement tools are becoming core operating requirements.

Tomar also highlights the Middle East’s changing role in global agri-trade. While the region remains structurally import-dependent, he says it is increasingly acting as an active food-system architect through investments in storage, logistics, processing, re-export hubs, vertical farming and food technology. From Saudi Arabia’s localisation ambitions to the UAE’s re-export and food security strategies, the region is moving beyond passive import dependence toward more sophisticated control over supply chains.

The interview also places pulses, climate risk and digitalisation at the centre of the next phase of food-system resilience. Tomar says pulses are finally receiving the policy and commercial attention they deserve. He also identifies water scarcity, extreme weather volatility and climate-driven regulation as long-term forces reshaping grain trade. For him, AI, traceability, digital documentation, market intelligence and logistics optimisation are no longer future concepts but practical tools that can reduce risk and improve efficiency across the grain value chain.

In the following interview, Tomar discusses the immediate risks facing agri-trade flows, the strategic importance of the India–Middle East corridor, the rising role of pulses, and the innovations needed to build more resilient food systems.

As someone who has spent decades at the intersection of agri-trade, food security and the India-Middle East corridor, what is your read on how the global food system is holding up right now amid the recent Middle East conflict?

The Strait of Hormuz is not just an oil corridor. Nearly a third of the world’s fertilizer and gas exports move through this narrow passage. Urea prices have already surged by more than half. When fertilizer becomes unaffordable, farmers plant less. When farmers plant less today, the world eats less next year. And that is not good. There is no ready alternative. Tanker traffic through the Strait collapsed by more than 90% within days of the conflict escalation. That is not a market disruption. It is a systemic shock, and it will take a long time to normalize.

FAO has already flagged Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. India is facing reduced domestic fertilizer production ahead of the monsoon seeding season. Egypt is also on the list because of its heavy reliance on wheat imports, and across sub-Saharan Africa, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique will be affected because of high fertilizer import dependency. I would also add my home, the Gulf states, to that list, as they are often overlooked in Western analysis. Gulf states face a food security challenge of their own, with import dependency averaging 75% for rice and exceeding 90% for corn, soybeans and vegetable oil. These are commodities that must now reach the Gulf through significantly more expensive alternative routes.

Although we are not yet in a 2022-style food price crisis, as global cereal stocks are comfortable, these stock numbers mask structural vulnerabilities. The duration of this conflict will be decisive. If the disruption is extended, it will affect global planting decisions for 2026 and beyond. At that point, we will be in a fundamentally different risk environment.

A NEW FOOD SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR THE INDIA–MIDDLE EAST CORRIDOR

How do you see the current strategic importance of the India-Middle East agricultural corridor?

Today, this corridor has become strategic infrastructure. It is a food security architecture. The current conflict in the region has made that distinction brutally clear to every government, every sovereign wealth fund and, frankly, every serious agribusiness executive who was still treating this as just another trade lane.

We established IMEAA precisely because we believed, long before it became consensus, that the India-Middle East agri corridor was not just a trade opportunity. It was a food security architecture that needed dedicated institutional champions, startup investment pipelines, government-to-government facilitation and on-the-ground multi-stakeholder networks. These food corridors are more than commerce channels. They form a larger diplomatic and economic framework that fortifies geopolitical ties, integrates supply chains and supports regional stability.

India-UAE bilateral trade crossed US$100 billion in FY 2024-25, driven significantly by the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signed in 2022, which accelerated both overall non-oil trade and agricultural flows. The UAE emerged as the second-largest importer of Indian agricultural products, with imports valued at approximately US$1.9 billion, accounting for 6.9% of India’s total agricultural exports. Critically, India supplies over 70% of the UAE’s rice imports, making it a structural cornerstone of Gulf food supply, not a discretionary relationship.

Now let us add the India-Oman CEPA, signed in December 2025. Oman has granted zero-duty access on 98.08% of its tariff lines, covering 99.38% of India’s exports by value, effective from day one of the agreement. That is not a marginal trade tweak. It is a comprehensive market opening that signals where the strategic direction of travel is heading: bilateral, corridor-by-corridor, food security-driven CEPAs across the Gulf.

The investment side confirms this. The UAE-India Food Security Corridor is a US$7 billion strategic initiative, including over US$2 billion in UAE investments in India’s food infrastructure, covering warehousing, cold storage, food processing and logistics. UAE-based companies have been making substantial investments in food parks and supply chain solutions across India.

The Middle East is one of the world’s most import-dependent regions for food. High heat, water scarcity and limited arable land structurally constrain domestic production. Many GCC nations struggle to achieve meaningful self-sufficiency. India, on the other side, has the production scale, agroclimatic diversity and agricultural labour base that the Gulf fundamentally needs.

For me, this is not a convenient partnership. It is a structural necessity for both sides. The anticipated India-GCC Free Trade Agreement, if concluded, could drive total corridor trade past US$250 billion by 2030.

GULF FOOD SECURITY ENTERS A NEW STRATEGIC PHASE

How is the Middle East’s role changing in global agri-trade? Is it still mainly an import market?

The honest answer is: both, simultaneously. That duality is precisely what makes this region so strategically interesting and important.

Yes, the fundamentals have not changed. GCC countries import up to 85% of their food, and that structural dependency is not disappearing overnight. But what is changing, fundamentally, is the food security diversification ambition layered on top of that dependency.

Saudi Arabia aims to localize 85% of its food processing in 11 domestic clusters by 2030. The Saudi Public Investment Fund is actively working with the private sector on vertical farming, indoor agriculture and food processing investment at a scale I have never seen before.

The UAE has doubled down on its re-export architecture and positioned itself as a global agri-trading hub, with the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC) hosting thousands of top agri-traders operating within the DMCC ecosystem. In 2024, the UAE’s total imports of agricultural products reached over US$25 billion, a 12% increase from 2023, with the UAE positioning itself as one of the world’s leading re-export hubs through free trade zones, low duties and modern infrastructure.

Add the UAE’s National Food Security Strategy 2051, the Saudi Vision 2030 food localization targets and the wave of agritech investment pouring into vertical farms, hydroponic facilities and alternative proteins, and the picture becomes clear. The Middle East is graduating from a passive import market to an active food system architect. For anyone in global agri-trade, that is not just a regional story. It is a structural market shift.

PULSES AND VALUE-ADDED FOODS EMERGE AS GROWTH AREAS

Which commodities will be most important in the next phase of India-Middle East cooperation?

I will give you my practitioner’s view, not what is already flowing, but what should and will flow next. Rice will remain the anchor. India supplies over 70% of the UAE’s rice imports. That relationship is structural, not discretionary. Basmati exports hit nearly US$5.87 billion in FY 2024-25. That lane is well established and will deepen under CEPA frameworks.

But the real growth story is in three areas. First, pulses. The Middle East has deep cultural consumption of chickpeas, lentils and beans. Thanks to processors such as AIS Group and Mellow, the UAE has already become one of the largest trading and processing hubs for pulses. With the current fertilizer shock making nitrogen-fixing, low-input pulse crops relatively more attractive to farmers globally, I expect India-Gulf pulse trade hub volumes to increase materially in the near future.

Second, value-added processed foods. Food preparations represent the UAE’s second-largest agricultural import category, valued at approximately US$720 million. Indian processors moving from raw commodity exports to packaged, branded, shelf-ready formats, such as paneer, frozen ready meals, fortified flours and spice blends, will capture disproportionate margin and market share.

Third, agritech and food technology. The UAE is investing in vertical farming, AI-driven precision agriculture and alternative proteins. India has the engineering talent and software capability to be a technology partner, not just a commodity supplier. That technology corridor, facilitated through platforms like IMEAA, is the most underexploited opportunity in this bilateral relationship today.

AGRI-TRADE RISKS MULTIPLY THROUGH THE VALUE CHAIN

With tensions in the Middle East and the Strait of Hormuz under pressure, what are the immediate risks for agri-trade flows?

The risks are real, layered and, critically, not yet fully priced into most procurement strategies I am seeing across the industry. Let me be specific. The Strait of Hormuz accounts for approximately 25% of the world’s oil supply and 20% of LNG exports. The region is also a major hub for fertilizer production and trade, accounting for as much as 35% of global urea exports and up to 30% of ammonia. When that corridor is disrupted, the impact on food systems is not linear. It multiplies through the entire value chain.

For grains, wheat and maize trade routes to North Africa and the Gulf are being rerouted at significantly elevated freight costs. War-risk insurance has moved from fractions of a percent to multiples. Vessel availability in the Arabian Sea has become tight and expensive.

For feed ingredients, soy, maize and DDGS shipments destined for Gulf livestock and poultry operations face both cost and timing disruptions, which cascade directly into domestic protein prices.

For food staples, Gulf states face a food security challenge, with import dependency averaging 75% for rice and exceeding 90% for corn, soybeans and vegetable oil, all of which must now reach Gulf ports through more expensive alternative routes.

My immediate concern is that procurement strategists are still working from pre-crisis models. Every miller, trader and processor exposed to this corridor should be stress-testing its supply chain for a medium- to long-term disruption scenario.

What are you seeing on the ground in terms of freight disruptions, shipment delays, insurance costs and buyer behaviour?

What I am seeing on the ground is a market in managed anxiety. Nobody is panicking. But serious operators are moving quietly and decisively.

Freight rates on key South Asia-Gulf routes have spiked significantly. War-risk insurance on vessels transiting the Arabian Sea has become a meaningful line item in landed cost calculations. I am hearing of premiums moving from 0.25% to upwards of 3-5% of fixed asset and vessel value on some routes, with spot rates even higher on certain sailings. That materially affects cost competitiveness for bulk commodity traders operating on tight margins.

Shipment delays are real but unevenly distributed. Dubai’s port infrastructure has been resilient, and Jebel Ali has continued operating. The bottleneck is not port handling capacity; it is increased expenses due to inland diversion, vessel availability and routing decisions. Shipping lines are repricing risk daily.

On buyer behaviour, the most sophisticated Gulf buyers, including large traders, sovereign-linked trading houses and government food security entities, are accelerating strategic reserve building and extending procurement horizons. I am seeing buyers who previously operated on 30-60-day coverage windows now seeking 90-120-day positions. That is a fundamental shift in buyer psychology.

What concerns me more is the mid-tier: regional millers, processors and distributors who lack the balance sheet to build extended inventory positions. They are being squeezed between higher input costs and buyers who are not yet fully absorbing price increases. That middle layer is where the real operational stress is concentrated right now.

DIVERSIFICATION, LONGER PLANNING AND POLICY INTELLIGENCE

Could this crisis speed up a shift toward shorter supply chains, more local processing and stronger food security partnerships?

Absolutely, and I would argue it already has. The question is not whether this happens, but how fast and with what quality of execution.

Every major supply chain crisis of the last decade, from COVID in 2020 to Ukraine in 2022, the Red Sea disruptions in 2023-24 and now this, has nudged governments and corporates one step further toward supply chain shortening and regional self-reliance.

GCC governments are pushing food security strategies involving investments of US$3.8 billion in agritech and food innovation, aiming to bolster local production and add US$30.5 billion to the regional economy. That capital was being deployed before this crisis. It is now being deployed faster and with greater urgency.

What I find particularly significant is the qualitative shift in political will. Food security is no longer a Ministry of Agriculture agenda item. It has moved to the highest levels of national security planning across Gulf governments. When Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 explicitly targets 85% food processing localization, that is not an agricultural policy. It is a strategic sovereignty statement.

For agribusiness executives, the implication is clear: proximity matters more than it did five years ago. Shorter supply chains, regional processing hubs and embedded local partnerships are no longer “nice to have” resilience measures. They are commercial requirements. The businesses that build local processing capacity and genuine partnership infrastructure in this region over the next three years will be structurally advantaged for the decade that follows.

What are the main lessons grain traders, millers and food processors should take from these disruptions?

Three lessons, and I say these as someone who has spent decades building large agri-multinationals across 26 countries before moving into institutional work.

First: concentration is a liability. Every crisis of the past five years has exposed the same flaw: single-source procurement, single-route logistics and single-currency exposure. The traders and processors that weathered Ukraine, COVID and the Red Sea disruptions better than their peers were those that had deliberately diversified origins, routes and counterparties. That is not a new insight. But clearly, it has not yet been sufficiently acted upon, because we keep learning the same lesson the hard way.

Second: the planning horizon must lengthen. As supply chains become more complex and fragmented, and as climate and geopolitical risks intensify, the case for digitalization and AI in grain trade has become compelling. You cannot manage a volatile world with quarterly planning cycles. Strategic reserve building, forward procurement and scenario planning for 6-12-month disruption windows are no longer optional risk management exercises. They are core operating competencies.

Third: food security is now a geopolitical asset. Governments are intervening in markets, through export restrictions, strategic stockpiling and bilateral corridor agreements, in ways that fundamentally alter the rules of global commodity trade. The India rice export controls of 2023 sent shockwaves through Gulf markets. Traders and processors that treat policy risk as a secondary consideration will continue to be caught off guard. Political intelligence is now part of procurement intelligence.

PROCUREMENT IN THE AGE OF CRISIS

What strategies should millers and grain processors adopt to build more resilient sourcing and procurement models?

I will give you five concrete strategies, not frameworks or concepts, but operational actions.

Origin diversification, immediately. If your wheat procurement is 60% or more concentrated in one origin, that is existential risk. The India-Gulf corridor gives you one pillar. Australia, Canada, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Argentina each give you another. Build and maintain active relationships with at least three origins per major commodity. The relationship infrastructure is the asset, not just the price negotiation.

Invest in strategic buffer inventory. The question of how many weeks of coverage to hold has a different answer today than it did in 2019. Although global cereal stocks-to-use ratios remain broadly adequate, that system-level comfort does not protect an individual miller facing a 90-day supply disruption. Build your own buffer, financed intelligently but built deliberately.

Secure logistics infrastructure, not just logistics contracts. Owning or having contractual priority access to warehouse capacity, silo space and port slots in key corridors gives you optionality that spot-market buyers simply do not have.

Embed digital procurement tools. Real-time market intelligence, AI-assisted price forecasting and digital documentation platforms reduce transaction friction and improve decision speed. AI already has the potential to anticipate market situations and support decision-making in real time. If your procurement team is still working from email and spreadsheets, you are operating at a structural disadvantage.

Build genuine supplier partnerships. The mills and processors that secured supply during earlier conflicts were those with long-standing, trusted relationships with producers and trading houses. Relationships are supply chain resilience.

PULSES FINALLY MOVE TO THE POLICY MAINSTAGE

Are pulses finally getting the policy and commercial attention they deserve?

Finally, yes. Though I will confess it has taken longer than it should have. I spent eight years, around 2012, raising US$5 million in sponsorships to help advocate for the UN International Year of Pulses in 2016. I sat with top leaders, including Prime Minister Modi in 2015, discussing India’s protein security. Along with the Global Pulses Confederation, I have been making the case on every platform available to us, including DMCC, IGC, FAO, GAFTA and Gulfood, for over two decades. So when I say the moment has arrived, I say it with some relief.

The global pulses market is projected to expand at a CAGR of 5.7%, rising from US$87.1 billion in 2026 to US$151.3 billion by 2036. The market is shifting from bulk agricultural trade to a processing-calibrated industrial ingredient ecosystem. That is a structural maturation of the sector I have spent my career advocating.

On the policy side, the current fertilizer crisis is proving, definitively, what pulse advocates have argued for years: nitrogen-fixing legumes reduce input dependency, improve soil health and deliver protein security with a fraction of the environmental cost of animal protein. Sustainability imperatives favouring pulses for their low water footprint and nitrogen-fixing properties are now driving adoption.

My one frustration is that per capita pulse consumption in India has fallen from 60g to 28g per person per day. We are producing more, exporting more and talking more, but we are not eating enough. Policy attention and efforts must now translate into increased pulse consumption campaigns, nutrition programmes and supply chain investment that puts pulses on plates, not just in trade statistics.

Do you see commercial opportunities for millers and food processors in pulse-based ingredients and protein diversification?

This is, without question, one of the most significant commercial opportunities available to millers and food processors today. The numbers are unambiguous. The pulse flour market is expected to grow from US$18.41 billion in 2025 to US$29.57 billion by 2031 at an 8.22% CAGR. The pulse ingredients landscape has moved from niche curiosity to central strategic priority for food manufacturers, ingredient formulators and ingredient traders.

The opportunity sits across three distinct commercial vectors. First, composite flours: blending pulse flours, such as chickpea, lentil and pea, with wheat creates products that are protein-enhanced, lower on the glycaemic index and often gluten-reduced. For millers with existing wheat flour infrastructure, adding pulse fractionation capacity is a margin-expansion play, not a greenfield investment.

Second, protein concentrates and isolates: pulse ingredients derived from peas, lentils, chickpeas and beans account for nearly 65% of plant-based protein ingredient applications globally. The alternative protein wave is not slowing, and pulse proteins are winning within that wave because of their clean-label credentials.

Third, the Middle East market specifically: the Middle East, led by Turkey, Egypt and the UAE, has strong cultural consumption of chickpeas, lentils and fava beans. A miller or processor building halal-certified, locally produced pulse flour and ingredient lines in the Gulf is not selling novelty. It is selling familiar nutrition in a more efficient, processed format.

The technical infrastructure, including dry fractionation, air classification and dehulling, is accessible and scalable. The market demand is building, and the policy environment is supportive. The window for first-mover advantage in pulse ingredient processing across South Asia and the Gulf is open now.

Which climate risks will have the biggest long-term impact on grain trade and food systems?

Three climate risks will, in my assessment, fundamentally reshape grain trade over the next generation, and all three are already visible.

First: Water scarcity. Just 4.7% of land in the Middle East and North Africa is arable, compared to 10.7% worldwide, and the region as a whole is the most water-scarce on earth. As aquifer depletion accelerates across wheat-producing regions of India, the US High Plains and North Africa, the geography of global grain production will shift. The exportable surplus from water-stressed regions will contract. Trade volumes will not necessarily shrink, but origins will change dramatically.

Second: Yield volatility from extreme weather events. The frequency and severity of simultaneous production shocks across multiple major growing regions are increasing. When India, the US and Europe all experience heat stress or drought events in the same crop year, the buffer of global stockpiles that historically smoothed price volatility is insufficient. The IGC’s 2026 Conference is rightly focused on this, covering the impact of a low-price environment on future supply and demand, risk management and innovation in logistics.

Third: The regulatory cascade from climate policy. Carbon border adjustment mechanisms, deforestation regulations and sustainability disclosure requirements are reshaping the trade cost structure for agricultural commodities moving between jurisdictions with different climate frameworks. For grain traders operating across the Global South and Europe, this is not a future compliance issue. It is a current commercial constraint.

PRACTICAL INNOVATION FOR FOOD SYSTEM RESILIENCE

What kinds of innovation can make the fastest practical impact on food systems?

I sit on jury panels at the FAO World Food Forum, the World Agri-FoodTech Challenge and now the IGC Smart Global Grains Trade Challenge, so we see a very wide range of innovation. My answer to this question comes from what I actually observe converting from concept to commercial traction.

The fastest practical impact will come from three categories.

Climate-smart crop varieties and regenerative agronomy. The innovations that help farmers maintain yields with less water, less synthetic fertilizer and improved soil carbon are the most mission-critical of all. Not because they are fashionable, but because without them, the supply side of global food systems cannot keep pace with the demand side under current climate trajectories.

Supply chain digitalization and traceability. Not glamorous, but transformative. Digital platforms are gaining traction and showing how versatile and efficient certification systems can be, reducing delays and fraud and enhancing trust in international trade. Every hour saved in certification, every fraudulent document eliminated and every shipment tracked in real time compound into billions of dollars of systemic efficiency across the global grain trade.

Precision fermentation and alternative protein. This is moving faster than most commodity traders appreciate. The Gulf is investing in it. Countries are investing heavily in alternative sustainable protein technology, from insect farming to cultured meat research. India has the biotech capability. The intersection is a significant opportunity.

AI TARGETS THE GRAIN TRADE’S BIGGEST DIGITAL BOTTLENECKS

What are the biggest digital bottlenecks in grain trade, and where can AI make the most practical difference?

Every year, more than 500 million metric tonnes of cereals and grains, valued at around US$156 billion, move across more than 140 exporting countries to close to 200 countries worldwide. This vast trade network connects thousands of grain trade stakeholders, supports millions of farmers and helps feed billions of consumers. And yet, large parts of it still run on PDFs, phone calls and personal relationships. That is the fundamental paradox.

I am privileged to be co-organising the IGC Smart Global Grains Trade Challenge 2026, a global competition supported by Microsoft AI for Good, identifying and spotlighting the most innovative technology-led solutions in grains trade digitalization. What we are seeing in submissions tells you exactly where the bottlenecks are.

Documentation and compliance are the single biggest pain points. Letters of credit, phytosanitary certificates, certificates of origin and quality inspection reports are paper-based, jurisdiction-specific, fraud-prone and slow. AI-enabled document processing and blockchain-based verification can compress a five- to seven-day process to hours.

Price discovery and market intelligence for smaller operators across the Global South are deeply asymmetric. Large multinationals have proprietary data infrastructure; smallholder cooperatives and regional millers are trading blind. AI-driven price forecasting tools democratize that intelligence.

Logistics optimization, including vessel scheduling, port slot allocation and route optimization under conflict or weather scenarios, is where AI’s real-time decision-support capability delivers immediate commercial value. AI is already being used to predict yields, detect crop stress and automate documentation and logistics. The next frontier is integrating these capabilities into a single, interoperable trade operating system.

Where do you see the most promising innovation opportunities across the grain value chain?

I will organise my answer around where value is being left on the table, because that is where innovation will flow.

Post-harvest loss reduction is the most underappreciated opportunity in the entire grain value chain. Globally, approximately 14% of food is lost between harvest and retail, and in South Asia and Africa, that figure is significantly higher. Affordable, solar-powered cold storage, hermetic storage solutions and mobile milling infrastructure deployed at the farm-gate level can recover enormous value without a single additional tonne of production.

Grain quality and authenticity verification are growing commercial and regulatory requirements. With the proliferation of food safety standards, sustainability certifications and geographic indication claims, the ability to verify grain origin, quality and handling chains through spectroscopy, AI imaging and blockchain creates both a compliance solution and a premium pricing opportunity.

Smallholder market linkage platforms, digital marketplaces that connect farmer producer organisations directly to millers, processors and exporters, bypassing layers of intermediaries, are showing real commercial traction across India, Bangladesh and East Africa. This is the category that can most directly increase farmer income while reducing procurement costs for buyers. Both sides of the trade benefit.

Finally, gene editing and crop biotech: advances in gene editing are rapidly reshaping the future of agriculture, offering new opportunities to enhance crop resilience, improve yields and address climate and food security challenges. The regulatory harmonisation question is complex, but the underlying science is delivering drought-tolerant, disease-resistant varieties at a pace that was unimaginable 15 years ago. This is the innovation with the longest lead time and the deepest eventual impact.

What still concerns you most about global food trade, and what gives you confidence?

My deepest concern is structural and persistent: the farmer in the Global South remains the weakest link in the food system despite being its most essential one.

The grain trade network connects thousands of stakeholders, supports millions of farmers and helps feed billions of consumers. And yet, in every crisis, every price spike and every market disruption, it is the farmer who absorbs the risk and the intermediary who captures the margin. That is a moral failure and an economic inefficiency simultaneously.

My second concern is the politicisation of food. When governments weaponise food or put restrictions and tariffs on food supply chains, the most vulnerable populations pay the price. Every export or import ban or restriction imposed by a major producing or importing nation in the last five years has had documented humanitarian consequences for food-deficit countries. We have many multilateral bodies, but the world still lacks an effective global mechanism to ring-fence food from the logic of geopolitical conflict.

What gives me confidence? Three things. The quality of young entrepreneurs entering agri-food innovation is genuinely inspiring. The institutional architecture, including FAO, GPC, IGC and platforms such as IMEAA, BSAF and SAAF, is stronger and better connected than at any point in my career. The commercial logic of food security investment has never been more compelling to both public and private capital.

My father taught me two things: be grateful to farmers, and do not gamble with food. Thirty years on, I am still fighting for both. And I am not done.